כָּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. וְכָל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מַעֲשֶׂה בִתְחִלָּתוֹ, תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. וְכָל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּמוֹ בְסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִלָּתוֹ, תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּם:
If one makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is void. [This entire Mishnah is in accordance with R. Meir, who holds that if one makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, even in respect to money matters, his condition is void. This is not the halachah. But, in monetary matters, even if one makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition stands.] And every condition preceded by an act is void. [If he prefaced the intended act to the desired condition, e.g., "This is yours, if you do this and this," (the condition is void). For it is not like the condition of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven, viz. (Numbers 32:29): "If they pass over … then you shall give, etc." where the condition precedes the act.] And whatever (condition) can be fulfilled at the end, if he stipulates it in the beginning, [the condition being prefaced to the act], the condition stands. [But if it is not possible to fulfill the condition, the condition is void and the act stands. For (in positing this impossible condition), he is only hyperbolizing, not really intending the condition, but only desiring to taunt and goad his neighbor with words.]
Tosefta Kiddushin
(Translated from the Ehrfurt manuscript:) Any stipulation which has the action at the beginning, such a stipulation is invalid. How so? [If he, the brother-in-law whose brother died, said to her, his dead brother's wife,] "Now that I have released you from the levirate bond, with the understanding that my father is happy about it", even if his father doesn't want this—she is divorced [since he already released her with halitzah]. "Now that I have had sex with you, [be betrothed to me] with the understanding that my father is happy about it", even if his father doesn't want this—she is betrothed [since they already had sex, the stipulation is void]. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father wants it—she is betrothed, for she only had sex because of that original condition. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar had a pneumonic: Any stipulation which is possible to do oneself or with an agent and he stipulated about it—his stipulation stands; but any stipulation that is impossible to do except with his body and he stipulated about it—his stipulation is void. How so? "Behold I divorce you with the understanding that my father is happy about it", if the father wants it—she is divorced; but if he doesn't want it—she is not divorced. "Behold I betroth you with the understanding that my father is happy about it", if the father wants it—she is betrothed; but if he doesn't want it—she is not betrothed.
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Tosefta Ketubot
Rabbi Yehudah says: [The husband] can always eat the fruits' fruit [i.e. the interest's interest, even if he said in the ketubah that he gives up access to the fruit from her property]. How so? He can sell the fruit and buy with [that money] land, and he can eat the fruit. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah say: If she dies, he inherits it [the fruit, even if he said he wouldn't have access to it in the ketubah], for she made a stipulation against what was written in the Torah and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is null and void.
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